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Abstract— It is well known that e-Government applications bring 
several benefits to citizens in terms of efficiency, accessibility and 
transparency. Today, most of governments tend to propose cloud 
computing based e-services to their citizens. A key component in 
these services is the access control management issue.  In this paper, 
we present our research works for building an access control system 
for the Djiboutian e-Government project that is built using Openstack 
framework. Specifically, we demonstrate the limitation of the 
integrated access control system in Openstack for the Djiboutian e-
Government access control requirements and for the compliance to 
the related regulation. Thus, we propose to extend the existing access 
control system of Openstack by integrating the features of the 
XACML V3 to the Openstack framework. 
Keywords—e-Government; e-services security; Access 
control; Cloud Computing; XACML; Openstack 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
e-Government refers to a way to serve the users of the 
public service through the use of new Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT)[1]. Usage of e-
Government systems contributes to government effectiveness 
by supplying users with easy access to public services as well 
as reducing operating costs of the administration.  
e-Government systems can be classified according to 
different target areas:   
- Government-to-Government (G2G), also known as e-
administration, refers to electronic collaboration 
between different government agencies. E-
administration facilitates the sharing of information 
between agencies,  
- Government-to-Citizen (G2C), is the process that 
electronically provides on-demand and personalized 
public services to citizens, in a centralized way,  
- Government-to-Business (G2B), sets up online 
relationship between government and the business 
sector in order to interactively provide information on 
regulations, advices, and procedures.  
In addition, services in e-Government have four levels of 
maturity [2] 1) catalogue level, which provides presence on the 
web through a simple web site for instance; 2) transaction level 
allowing interactivity between governmental agency and their 
consumers; 3) vertical integration level where integration of 
scattered systems at different levels is performed, 4) horizontal 
integration level where information obtained by one agency 
will propagate through out all government functions.  
Although the e-Government system can generate 
productivity gains, its implementation costs a lot in terms of 
both financial and human resources. Deploying data center for 
each public administration sector is a significant cost to 
governments [3]. Also, management of maintenance, security, 
and upgrade requires as many qualified IT staffs as data 
centers. Often the failures of e-Government systems projects 
are due to those costs [4]. 
To deal with those cost issues and setting up e-Government 
systems readily, recent e-Government projects are deployed on 
Cloud Computing [5]. Thanks to on-demand computing and 
infrastructure, Cloud computing offers rapid scalability and 
deployment capabilities to e-Government system regardless of 
the ICT state of administrative agencies [3]. Cloud Computing 
permits any department within e-Government systems to 
deploy all kind of eGovernment services by provisioning 
upstream stacking needs - from infrastructure to software –, as 
a service.  
Our work is done in the context of the Djibouti 
eGovernment project. Currently, the government of Djibouti 
has adopted cloud computing for its e-Government named 
eGovernment Cloud Community (eGCC).  
Although cloud computing facilities E-Government 
development, it brings out also new challenges [7]. Among 
those, our task focuses on security and privacy issues. Security 
ranges from the transmission to the storage through identity 
and access management of information/data in eGCC. Privacy, 
in turn, is essential to guarantee protection of personal 
information collected by a government against the derivatives, 
such as discriminations.  
Each agency has its own access control and privacy 
policies. Due to multi-tenancy of eGCC services and 
heterogeneousness of agencies’ access control and privacy 
policies, it is impractical to implement a tailored access control 
model for every policy. As a consequence, a generic and 
flexible system for enforcing both policy types must be 
conceived. We propose in this article to follow an Attribute-
Based Access Control (ABAC) approach using the OASIS 
XACML [8] specification.  
 The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
importance of cloud computing for e-Government services and 
also the security challenges. Section 3 analyses Openstack [12] 
for implementing eGCC. Section 4 describes the integration of 
XACMLv3 and Openstack. Finally, we draw our conclusion 
and perspectives in section 5. 
II. CLOUD COMPUTING AND E-GOVERNMENT 
Governments are facing two main challenges when it 
comes to proposing e-Government services to their citizens. 
First, the amount of information held by governments is too big 
and increases very quickly. Second, large parts of this data 
contain sensitive information that must be protected efficiently.  
Handling those challenges in a traditional way consists in 
buying a dedicated IT infrastructure that will be set up for 
storing the government’s information and hosting their e- 
applications.   
This way presents several disadvantages for governments. 
Governments have to setup different kinds of resources for 
managing the upgrade of their IT infrastructure in order to meet 
their increasing needs in terms of performance and storing 
capacity. Indeed, using the same technology for several years 
include different risks in terms of storing capacity and 
availability of e-services. In addition, the costs needed for 
maintaining the IT infrastructure can be enormous and 
unpredictable; thus the quality of maintenance can be degraded 
because of budget issues. 
A. Cloud computing 
Recently, a new vision of how using and managing the IT 
resources have been developed. This vision delivers all 
discipline, technology, and business models, which setup a 
powerful IT infrastructure and present it as a service for end 
users. This is called “Cloud computing”. The NIST defines 
cloud computing as: 
“Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, 
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction.” [6] 
Thus, cloud computing is a set of computing resources that 
are accessible by end users according to their needs (on-
demand network access to a shared pool). 
From organizations perspective, cloud computing offers 
many advantages [9]; in particular:  
1. Cost savings: Cloud computing enable 
organizations to reduce their costs in terms of 
purchase of new equipment, personnel 
employment and maintenance. Additionally, cloud 
providers offer interesting options of payment that 
help organizations save their cost (e.g.,   “pay as 
you use”).  
2. Scalability: a great feature of the cloud computing 
is its capacity to meet dynamically the increasing 
needs of organizations.   
3. Low maintenance: maintaining an IT 
infrastructure is always challenging for 
organizations. By using cloud computing, 
organizations delegate this issue to cloud 
providers. 
B. Benefits of cloud computing for e-Government 
Cloud computing solutions bring many benefits for e-
Governments [3]. Cloud computing reduces public agencies 
investment in term of technologies deployment in order to 
implement e-Government-based services. Indeed, instead of 
having a data center for each public agency (that would leads to 
situations where computer materials are often under or over-
used), a central cloud computing constitutes an ultimate 
solution for e-Governments. Cloud computing aggregates the 
computer resources of the public administration in one data 
center. In addition, thanks to virtualization offer, it permits to 
agencies to have their own data center as a service without 
worrying about cooling and electrical issues. Thus, 
governments can concentrate their efforts on the business 
issues of their e-services. 
Cloud computing have three core levels of service [6]. 
- Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): At this level, the 
cloud provider makes available to consumers a set of 
computing resources capabilities to deploy and run an 
information system (IS) such as server, operating 
system, storage and networks.  
- Platform as a Service (PaaS): is a level aimed at 
programming and application development 
environments.  
- Software as a Service – SaaS: Software is accessible 
via a web interface. Software is not purchased it is 
rented.  
In addition to service model, Cloud Computing can be 
deployed according to four models [6]. 
- Private cloud. Cloud infrastructure is provisioned for 
exclusive use by a single organization comprising 
multiple consumers (e.g., business units). It may exist 
on or off premises. 
- Community cloud. A specific community of consumers 
from organizations, that have shared concerns, 
provisions cloud infrastructure for its exclusive use. It 
may exist on or off premises. 
- Public cloud. The general public provisions the cloud 
infrastructure for open use. It exists on the premises of 
the cloud provider. 
- Hybrid cloud. The cloud infrastructure is a 
composition of two or more distinct cloud 
infrastructures (private, community, or public) that 
remain unique entities, but are bound together by 
standardized or proprietary technology that enables 
data and application portability (e.g., cloud bursting for 
load balancing between clouds). 
Obviously, governments prefer the private or/and community 
deployment models because they give more control to 
governments in terms of government 
Generally, Governments don’t accept the
sensitive data in servers that are located
borders. That’s why different countries (e.g.
have favored the development of a nation-w
G-cloud, for their governments [10]. 
In the Djiboutian e–government project,
the community deployment model, w
“community” refers to the Djiboutian gov
Also, we have adopted Openstack for i
Djiboutian eGCC infrastructure. 
C. Security challenges in eGCC 
Traditionally public agencies manage int
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III. IMPLEMENTING E-GOVERNMEN
REQUIREMENTS IN OPENSTAC
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In this section, we demonstrate that Open
security features for implementing eGCC. 
A. Introduction to Openstack 
Openstack consists in several services de
functionalities. Nova is designed to create a
machines. It is compatible with the majority
technologies (Xen, KVM, Hyper-V, LXC)
Nova is performed through an API or a Dash
HORIZON). Swift can be defined as a file sy
stores large amounts of unstructured data via
API. Cinder provides persistent storage for
When a virtual machine is destroyed, 
maintained. Glance is the registration and d
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 D2 and D3. In order to enhance 
, AG wants to setup a G2G 
, AG creates virtual data center 
 VDC from an eGCC provider. Each department must have a 
specific computing infrastructure for its business requirements. 
Different resources are provided to each department such as 
servers, networking and storage facilities. 
Each department has a dedicated IT manager who 
administrates these resources or delegates tasks to sub-
administrators. Agency AG has defined the following security 
policies and regulations compliance rules that departments 
must enforce: 
- P1: Employees of AG are permitted to use the 
services provided by their departments. According to 
their functions, employees have specific permissions 
on services. 
- P2: Employees of AG cannot execute any 
administrative task outside working hours. Exception 
is granted to IT technicians of departments according 
to their periods of standby duty. 
In addition to these policies, AG formulates legal 
constraints (LCx) to be respected such as: 
- LC1: regulation advices to encrypt resources of 
department D1. 
- LC2: Due to classification category, regulation 
requires to encrypt resources of department D3. 
On the basis of the above use case, requirements below 
must be filled. 
Req1 - There must have flexible access controls models 
allowing specifying authorization rules according to roles 
or complex time periods.  
Req2 - The authorization system must also include 
obligations and advices. 
Req3 - Administrators must have full control on employees’ 
permissions. Several levels of administrators must exist. 
C. Analysis of e-Government security requirements 
Analysis of Req1: The current Openstack access control model 
allows specifying several concepts. This model being an 
extension of RBAC, roles for managing employees already 
exist. In addition, it is possible to represent a department using 
the concept of Openstack project. Collaboration between 
departments can be expressed by grouping projects in 
domains. An example that uses domains can be founded in 
[11]. However, the Openstack access control model does not 
allow contextual permissions such as “no access outside 
working hours”.  
Analysis of Req2: Openstack does not support regulations 
compliance expression including obligations and advices. As 
eGovernment service requires compliance with legislative 
directives, Openstack have to put up capability to express 
regulation constraints and enforce them dynamically. 
Analysis of Req3: Openstack defines the role of project 
administrator. However, a project administrator cannot create 
roles attached to its project. Project administrator should 
contact Openstack provider to perform this task.  In addition, 
there is only one project administrator role and no role 
hierarchy. As consequence, it is not possible to define several 
levels of administrators with different administration 
permissions. 
IV. INTEGRATING XACMLV3 INTO OPENSTACK FOR 
COVERING E-GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS 
We propose to integrate XACMLv3 to cover these 
shortcomings of current Openstack. 
A. Introduction to XACMLv3 
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) 
version 3 is an XML-based specification for access control that 
has been standardized by OASIS [8]. XACML describes an 
architecture, an attribute-based access control policy language 
and a request/response language.  
XACML provides a management architecture that 
describes the different entities and their roles related to the 
decision making process. A data-flow model describes this 
architecture that is similar to previous XACML version. 
 
Figure 2. The XACML Architecture [8] 
The model operates by the following steps. 
1. Policy Administration Points (PAP) write policies and 
policy sets and make them available to the Policy Decision 
Point (PDP). These policies or policy sets represent the 
complete policy for a specified target. 
2. The access requester sends a request for access to the 
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP).  
3. The PEP sends the request for access to the context 
handler in its native request format, optionally including 
attributes of the subjects, resource, action and 
environment. 
4. The context handler constructs a standard XACML request 
context and sends it to the PDP. 
5. The PDP can request any additional subject, resource, 
action and environment attributes from the context handler 
if needed. 
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